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Abstract
1 Since the eighties the World Bank, in collaboration with the Moroccan authorities,  is
trying to change existing sheephusbandry practices in the Middle Atlas in order to arrest
soil erosion. In accordance with development philosophy local organisations are given a
great role in the management of the project. The research showed that the local herders'
associations  had become completely  incorporated into  the local  power  network.  The
influential  herd  owners  had  appropriated  the  advantages  connected  with  the  local
associations whereas several responsibilities, as for example the need to decrease stock
numbers, were passed on to the less influential, notably the immigrant herdsmen. The
reliance on local organisations in fact ran counter to a sustainable environment. Local
management  of  common  natural  resources  can  only  be  successful  if  the  Moroccan
authorities are willing to address local power distribution. Examples are given that the
authorities  were  able  to  do  so  which,  in  turn,  helped  to  decrease  environmental
degradation.
Introduction
2 In a FAO‑study is stated that about US$ 1000 million of donor funds were ineffectively
spent  during  the  1970s'  and 1980s  on group ranches  and grazing  schemes  in  Africa
because the schemes paid insufficient attention to local cultures and needs. Since the
1980s the development set, captained by the World Bank, paid more attention to the role
local institutions and organisations can play in projects and programs. After a critical
survey  of  livestock  projects,  Eicher  and  Baker  (1982 :170),  put  forward :  "Large‑scale
government ranches were tried in numerous countries over the 1960‑75 period with the
support of the World Bank and several bilateral donors. But commercial and government
ranches have performed poorly in most countries. The failure of numerous commercial
and  government  ranches  in  the  past  two  decades,  supplemented  with  increasing
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population  pressure  and  concerns  with  equity,  have  forced  many  governments  to
de‑emphasize  commercial  ranches  and  move  toward  group  ranches,  grazing  blocks
(associations),  and  assistance  to  small  herders".  The  anthropologist‑consultant
Dyson‑Hudson  argues  in  favour  of  livestock  projects  which  fits  closely  with  the
population too. He therefore prefers local livestock associations to 'group and company
ranches' (1985).
3 In several studies and policy‑documents it is not only suggested to link up with local
patterns of  organizations but to increase their  influence (but to assign them a more
prominent  role)  too.  This  subscribes  the  view  that  the  state  has  failed  as  a
development‑agency  as  was  mentioned  above.  In  April  1991  the  FAO and the  Dutch
Ministry of Agriculture, Nature Management and Fisheries organized a conference on
'Sustainable  Agriculture  and  Rural  Development'.  In  the  contribution  on  livestock
production it is argued that land degradation can only be stopped when overgrazing can
be kept  under control.  This  will  only succeed when there is  communal  control  over
grazing pressure and pastoral groups or associations are created or strenghened (FAO, n°
3, 1991 :15,19). In the contribution on 'Social and Institutional Aspects of a Sustainable
Agriculture (FAO, n° 5), it is put forward that communal land must be preserved because
it is a last avenue for the poor section of pastoralists. For a sustainable management of
the common pastures the local community must have a decisive role in planning and
implementation. This means the devolution of power from the state to local groups. In
many policy documents and reports this view of the F AO is endorsed.
4 In this contribution I will level criticisms against the role local institutions should play in
development projects, in casu the importance attached to local management of common
rangeland. Two staff‑members of the World Bank (Bromley and Cernea, 1989) argue that
in the
5 'group  ranching  project'  in  the  Middle  Atlas,  Morocco,  the  local  authorities  have
succeeded in introducing grazing roles, including stocking rates while the lineage‑council
had  been  able  to  introduce  grazing  fees  and  controlled  the  access  to  the  common
pastures.
6 We are  left  in  the  dark  which  facts  endorse  this  statement  of  the  two  World  Bank
functionaries.  We  will  demonstrate  that  in  this  project  the  traditional  institutions
pertaining to local management of natural resources have since long been undermined by
a process of increasing polarization. The involvement of local groups in the management
of  common  rangeland  means  little  more  than  that  local  power  constellations  are
reinforced. In addition, in this as well as in many other documents it is overlooked who
constitutes the local population. What are the rights of the immigrant families, especially
if they live in the area for a time‑span of a generation or more ? At last, must we accept
the  free  play  of  societal  forces  or  is  there  also  a  role  to  play  for  the  government ?
Successively these questions will be treated below.
The myth of an egalitarian society
7 The Beni Mguild Berbers live in the central‑northern part of the Middle Atlas. Their main
activity is sheep herding. In the summer the sheep are pastured on the highlands, in the
winter on the lowlands. It is a type of transhumance with a vertical migration pattern.
Because of these seasonal movements they lived in tents. In addition to tents they also
had houses, made of stones, loam and wood in which agricultural equipment and grain
were stored. The cluster of houses, called ighrem, most often was located in the winter
pastures or in the transitional area between summer and winter pastures. According to
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historical documents families left the house in spring to live in the tent in the summer
pastures. Only a guard remained in the house. Nowadays the Beni Mguild are settled and
it is the shepherd who lives in a tent on the far‑off pastures.
8 The Beni Mguild were incorporated in the market‑economy since centuries. The trade
between Europe and West Soudan passed in transit through this area : the caravan routes
traversed  right  across  the  pastures  of  the  Beni  Mguild.  Azrou,  the  most  important
marketplace of the Beni Mguild, was part of this trading route. On this market they sold
hides, wool, butter and cattle in exchange for tea, sugar and weapons. The trade activities
yielded the Beni Mguild important secondary revenues because they levied tribute from
passing traders. Several records of travel give ample attention to the fact that the tributes
were high and were levied quite often several times. It occurred that trade was suspended
for this reason (see a.o. Rohlfs, 1868).
9 The levying of tribute did not only occur among the Beni Mguild but everywhere where
the central government was weak. Throughout the history we see that the Sultanate tried
to submit the tribes in order to establish a trade monopoly. But sooner or later the
central government lost its hegemony and it is only from the rule of Hassan I (1873‑1894)
onwards that the Beni Mguild were forced to collaborate with the central government. 
10 Due  to  the  incorporation  of  the  Beni  Mguild  in  trade  capitalism patterns  of  power
concentration had developed. According to French researchers the Beni Mguild society
could be characterized as a segmentary society. According to them the lineage formed the
basic unit of the camp of tents and of the ighrem. Every lineage had a council of elder
(djema)  which  took  the  important  decisions  as  regards  the  date  of  sowing,  the
appointment of a Koran teacher etc. One of the important issues the lineage‑council dealt
with was the moment of departure to the summer and the winter pastures. It was very
important that the winter pastures were left ungrazed long enough in order that grass
could grow sufficiently enough before it was grazed anew.
11 Several  lineages,  sharing common interests,  could constitute a tribe and tribes could
together make up a confederation. So the Beni Mguild are in fact composed of three
tribes, the Irklaouan, the Ait Abdi and the Ait Arfa de Guigou. Every tribe defended its
rancheland, wells and its right to levy tribute vis à vis the other tribes. The tribe had a
council too, composed of representives of the lineages. In the case several lineages had
the right of access to the same pasture it was the tribal council which decided about the
grazing pattern of the lineages concerned.
12 This analysis by the researchers of the day presented an idealized version of the facts. As
regards cooperation between lineages we have to be realistic. Outside the lineage, even
inside the lineage, clublaw counted. Dabancens (1951) argued : “The greater the tent the
more male adults it will count able to bear arms, the greater its influence in the djema"
(transl. by author). When lieutenant Bertschi in 1911 scouted the area he noted such a
limited power of the lineage‑councils compared to local influentials that it seemed to him
that the Beni Mguild were ruled by anarchy (A.N. D.A.I. n° 407).
13 In view of these social patterns it is not amazing there were strong differences in wealth
too.  Important  tribal  elder  had been able  to  enrich themselves  by monopolizing the
levying of tribute (Foucault, 1995 :7). In addition, some relative permanent patron‑client
relations had developed. Many immigrants had settled themselves in Azrou and in some
other centres and they exploited the forests on account of middlemen of Fez and Meknes.
These woodcutters were only able to do so because they or their superieurs had paid
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protection money. Because the woodcutters had established themselves permanently, the
latter disposed of a continuous flow of side‑revenues which they invested in cattle or in
land.
14 From the first tribal leaders, on which we have some facts, the following is known. A man
from the lineage Ait Amar (Irklaouan), Aarabe, was the tribal leader. Because of his strong
position in the tribe he was appointed as caid (sort of district officer) of the Irklaouan by
Sultan Hassan I. He obtained the privilege to levy tax of which he could appropriate a
part.  He  became  very  soon  rich  and  he  built  a  fortress  in  Azrou  and  disposed  of
body‑guards. He was succeeded by his son who was able to obtain a comfortable standard
of living too as we will see below. Another caid, appointed by a rival of the Sultan took
advantage of the turbulent times just before the Protectorate to occupy fertile land near
Azrou next to five wells. The mills he constructed there gave him additional revenues.
These examples prove that before the Protectorate the Beni Mguild society could not be
depicted as egalitarian.
Increasing differentiation as a consequence of the Protectorate
15 With the establishment of the Protectorate economic polarization increased considerably.
Contrary to the policy in Algeria the colonial government in Morocco tried to involve the
local authorities in policy‑implementation. This was also the case among the Beni Mguild.
Those tribal leaders, already appointed as a caid by the Sultan, could continue to occupy
their post as long as they were capable to do the job. Imitating the practices of the colons
who had established themselves in Azrou, the tribal leaders bought private land from the
tribesmen too. They had ample opportunity to do this because of the income deriving
from tax‑collecting. Just as the colons did they also pinched communal land before the
colonial administration was able to demarcate the communal rangelands.
16 The son of caid Arabe became a district‑officer in Azrou and embezzled the communal
land of the village Ben Smim. Part of his revenues he invested in a large fondouk (local
hotel) which started to operate in 1922. He owned 3000 sheep and 1000 ha private land in
1937 (A.N., D.A.I. dossier 407). For a comparison : most pastoralists did not own more than
100 sheep and some hectares of agricultural land. The caids of the Ait Abdi and Ait Arfa de
Guigou have enriched themselves too at the expense of the ordinary tribesmen. They not
only  succeeded  by  filching  land  but  also  by  using  duty‑labour  for  personal  aims
(Belghiti‑Alaoui,  1978 :  224).  At  the  end  of  the  colonial  area  it  occurred  the  French
government had to protect the caids against the fury of the tribesmen.
17 After independence the local government became composed of men who had been active
in the movement for independence or men who at least had not collaborated with the
French.  Most  tribal  leaders  therefore were not  qualified for  a  position in local  state
burocracy and they lost the posts they occupied. Quite often the positions were occupied
by people from the cities. However, they have played the same tricks as the caids did in
the colonial period. They have profited considerably from the departure of the colons.
Large agricultural farms, saw‑mills, stores etc. were obtained for fancy prices or were
obtained by force (Venema, 1992). In Morocco, and in the Middle Atlas, the government
bureaucracy is not at all a goal‑oriented smooth‑running machine. The officials try to
take advantage from their position.
18 The way in which during the Protectorate was collaborated with the tribal leaders and
the possibilities  to enrich onself  after  independence has considerably increased local
economic differentiation.
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The myth of a homogeneous society from another point of view
19 The Beni Mguild are pastoralists and they left trading to other people. Many inhabitants
of the Beni Mguild area originally came from elsewhere. The study of Belghiti‑Alaoui
(1978) showed that in 1880 Azrou was divided in two wards. The first was composed of
houses of the lineage Ait Amer (of the tribe Irklaouan) and was called ighrem Aqdim. The
other ward was inhabited by immigrants and was called ksar Ait Gheriss after the name of
the inhabitants. According to oral tradition these Ait Gheriss, originating from the south,
had arrived here in the second half of last century in order to take advantage of trading
opportunities. In an attempt to protect themselves against robberies they preferred to
have their ward walled in but this was prevented by the tribal leaders. Only when Sultan
Hassan  I  had  submitted  the  area,  caid  Aarabe  allowed  the  inhabitants  to  start  the
construction of the wall.
20 So we see that immigrant traders had established themselves among the Beni Mguild
quite early. They had not only settled themselves in Azrou but in Ain Leuh and Timahdite
as well (Dabancens, 1951 ; A.N., D.A.I, dossier 401). But not only traders had arrived. As we
already have seen the Beni Mguild area counted a number of woodcutters who worked on
account of townspeople. After the 'pacification' more strangers settled in the rural areas.
These immigrants worked as agricultural labourers, shepherds and guards (Laoust, 1935 ;
Dabancens, 1951). Because the shepherds were renumerated against part of the increase
of the herd they had access to the communal rangelands. Those shepherds who live since
long in the area and who share village obligations and pay their fees are to be conceived
of as having the same rights as the autochtonous population (A.N., D.A.I. dossier 407).
21 The flow of newcomers increased in the colonial area. As mentioned before, the Beni
Mguild area had been pacified in the colonial area. Immediately thereafter the first colons
arrived to build a livelyhood in agriculture, forestry or trade. Because of the arrival of
foreigners  the  need  of  manpower  was  great,  especially  in  construction  works  and
agriculture. The centres of Azrou and Ain Leuh increased spectacularly in size. In the
period 1926‑1947 Azrou increased from 1593 to 7983 inhabitants and Ain Leuh from 1423
to 3817. The census showed that the major part of the inhabitants came from elsewhere
(Beaudet, 1969). The strangers were especially people from the south, partly from Arabic
partly from Berher origin (Ait Gheriss, Ait Morghad, etc.). After the Second World War
many Riffis from the north came to this area because in their home‑area it had become
impossible to eke out an existance due to increasing population pressure.
22 Many  immigrant  families,  especially  the  Ait  Gheriss,  were  traders.  Barter  was  quite
common before the establishment of the Protectorate. Just before the Protectorate the
pastoralists  exchanged one or two lambs for one sugar‑loaf  (rital,  about 1500 gram).
These lambs were kept in the herd of the original owner but two‑third of the increase
belonged  to  the  trader  or  shopkeeper.  In  this  way  traders  who  succeeded  in  doing
business arrived to have herds of sheep of their own.
23 The increase of the population sided with an increase of land used for agriculture. The
land under crops increased from 19.250 ha in 1930 to 32.900 ha in 1955, an increase of 71
%. (Beaudet, 1969 :35). Because the grazing pressure on the pastures led to increasing
tensions among the pastoralists, the Beni Mguild started to deny the recently arrived
immigrants access to the communal pastures. They were no longer conceived as regular
citizins. It seems that the first endeavours to exclude strangers to have tenure rights
started since the forties.
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24 However, these endeavours could not succeed because the Beni Mguild were notable to
act as a whole. Some Bemi Mguild did not give in to pressures to chase strangers from the
pastures but vindicated their personal aims. So some pastoralists made an arrangement
with a newcomer. For a remuneration the indigenous herd owner was willing to add the
strangers'  herd to his own. To his fellow tribesmen he pretended all  sheep were his.
According to my informants conflicts between the original population and newcomers
and  increased  suspicion  between  locals  as  regards  secret  arrangements  would  have
started in the forties.
25 From what is said above it follows that the local population not only differed in wealth
but  that  also  a  distinction  has  to  be  made  between  the  indigenous  and  immigrant
population. Leaving the market centres apart, in the rural area about a third of the total
population originated from the outside (Bencherifa and Johnson,  1991 :192).  The Beni
Mguild appears not to be a homogenous population at all.
The herders' association project and what has been achieved
26 In the early eighties the grazing pressure was such that in average there were three sheep
for every hectare pastureland while, according to calculations, only one sheep and a lamb
for every hectare was the upper limit in order to prevent rangeland degradation. The
erosion,  which  presented  itself  in  gullies  and  soil  subsidence,  had  become  a  major
problem. An important reason for soil erosion was that several pastoralists no longer
moved their herd between summer and winter pastures but had their herd grazing the
same area continuously. Most often these herds remained in the less populated winter
pastures. However, only farmers who could dispose of a fold and fodder in order to tide
over the period of  snow‑fall  were able to do this.  In addition trucking in water was
sometimes  necessary.  So  only  for  the  rich  pastoralists  livestock‑keeping  became
sedentarized. Already at the end of the Protectorate many pastoralists had built a fold. In
the period 1940‑80 the Ait Arfa de Guigou had built 260 folds on the collective pastures
and they had started cultivating barley and lucerne as foddercrops.
27 Although at first glance these developments in livestock production show as livestock
intensification, this is not the case. The fact that folds were constructed on the communal
pastures means that common land had been de facto appropriated. The owners of the
folds started to chase the flocks from the other shepherds and, if necessary, they do it by
force. Once they have established their authority they have their herd graze the area
permanently. This means that the rest‑time in early spring, allowing the regrowth of
grass,  is  no  longer  respected.  The  abandonment  of  the  rest‑time  as  a  custom  has
considerably contributed to the degeneration of the common pastures.
28 This individalistic behaviour follows logically from the desintegration of local patterns of
cooperation and mutual consultation during the colonial area. Because of the possibilities
of enrichment, clublaw had come very much to the fore. During the Protectorate the
construction of  folds  had been connived at  and the influentials,  especially  the tribal
leaders have profited from it. Less influential lineage‑members have accepted this state of
affairs because of the collaboration between the French authorities and the tribal leaders.
However. traditional forms of cooperation withered away.
29 At  the  end of  the  seventies  the  extent  of  land erosion was  such that  the  Moroccan
government and the World Bank agreed to intervene. At the start of the eighties the
preliminary research started. It was decided to leave the pastures in communal use but to
regulate it by the introduction of pastoral associations. These are groups of herders who
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have agreed to cooperate with the government. The associations would try to arrest land
degradation by the introduction of stocking rates. In fact it was proposed that pasture
ceiling would be introduced. The loss of income would be met by an increase in livestock
production by improvement of animal husbandry and the development of agriculture.
Livestock  intensification  would  be  achieved  by  means  of  breed  improvement,  the
amelioration of  veterinary services  and the introduction of  foddercrops.  These crops
could be cultivated on land that was left fallow. In certain areas it was encouraged to
change cereal cultivation into horticulture.
30 Between  1983‑1987  $92  million  was  spent  in  the  'Projet  Moyen  Atlas'.  The  project
obtained some tangible results. Several local roads have been constructed to facilitate
contact with the veterinary service. Now it is also easier to reach the cattle market so that
the  herders  can operate  more efficiently.  In  addition several  water  point  have  been
constructed which has decreaded the number of conflicts as regards access to water. The
herders have a great interest to obtain pedigree rams and prices went up to high levels
due to the increase in demand. Livestock ‑keepers with fertile land in the lower valleys
have started with horticulture.
31 In the district Timahdite a dynamic caid, in collaboration with the rural council, the local
judge  and  the  lineage‑elder  have  succeeded  in  determining  the  boundaries  of  the
common pastures and in fixing a rotating schedule. If a contravention occurred the caid 
seized the cattle and is only returned after the owner has been fined. The role of the
lineage‑council and lineage‑elder has become of minor importance. It is now the caid, the
judge and the rural elected council who decide on land arrangements [see for the role of
government officials in animal husbandry among the neighbouring Ait Ayash : Chiapuris
(1980) and among the Ait Youssi : Geertz & Rosen (1979)].
What not has been reached
32 On the other side the results  of  the project  are disappointing.  Until  1990 only three
herders'  associations  had  been  created.  When  becoming  a  member  of  a  herders'
association one has in principle  accepted to decrease the size of  the herd while  the
government officials have promised to increase the productivity of the herd. It appears
that  members  in the scarse  period (winter)  can obtain fodder  (sunflower cake)  with
subsidy. They can also obtain prize money when the herd has improved in breed. Those
who are member have the advantage that a veterinary assistant controls the herd in
order to detect diseases and other problems. It proves that the government indeed tries
to introduce a more intensive sheep husbandry.
33 It appears, however, that only a small number of herd owners has become member of the
association. The association of Timahdite, Tarat, has 26 members with a total of 11.050
heads of sheep. The association of Ain Leuh, Tithissi, has 22 members with a total of came
of 13.060 head. The third association, Amghass, has 16 members with 15.000 head. By
estimation only about 1 % of the livestock‑owners is a member of an association. In 1985
the total number of sheep among the Beni Mguild was estimated at 650.000 head : the
number of sheep in associations (about 6%) is small indeed.
34 The members of the associations in average owned 610 heads of sheep. The range was
between 150 and 1200 sheep.  So it  appears that  especially  the rich pastoralists  have
become a member. For the poor livestock‑keepers the entrance‑fee is already too high. In
order to have a working capital the entrance fee amounts to 400 dirham, equaling the
value of a sheep.
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35 But there is something else which matters here too. It appears that the poor herdsmen
have  in  fact  no  access  to  the  pastoral  association.  The  large  herd  owners  of  the
association argue that they do not have the wherewithal to build up a fine herd. For
example they are not in the possibility to buy fodder of sufficient quality for the winter
period. In addition they do not own a sheep‑fold. The members of the association appear
not to accept as a member somebody with a poor herd which may detiorate the quality of
the  common  herd.  In  addition,  they  prefer  to  keep  the  prizes  and  subsidies  for
themselves. The president of the association of Ain Leuh is a very large herd owner who
only accepts family‑members to enter the association. The president of the association of
Timahdite  is  a  rich  herd  owner  too  who  only  accepts  family‑members  and  rich
acquintances. Small herdsmen explained to me they not even dared to ask to become a
member if there was no family‑relationship.
36 The aim to achieve a reduction in number of cattle has not been met. The members of the
association are big livestock owners and they want to remain it  that  way.  The rural
council too did not succeed to introduce destocking. The reason is that the council is
composed of big herd owners. If  we take the 45 members of the three rural councils
(Irklaouan, Ait Abdi and Ait Arfa du Guigou) together, then 35 own more than 200 heads
of sheep. Members of the rural council are in the board of the pastoral association too. So
the president of the council of Timahdite is president of the herders' association too,
while the president of the association of Ain Leuh is even a member of the Provincial
Council. So from the council‑members little initiative in destocking can be expected.
37 We may conclude that the pastoral association project in the Middle Atlas has been a
failure in view of the low membership rate. Those who have become a member cash in the
profits  but  they  do  not  decrease  their  herd  as  has  been  promised  to  the  project
authorities. Land degradation therefore continues to be an important phenomenon in
this area.
The free play of societal forces or a role to play by the state ?
38 Despite the encouragements of the government the population has not prevented the
process of land degradation to continue. A major role was played by the big herd owners
who have blocked the pastoral association project.
39 However, on some domains the government has succeeded to implement land‑use policy.
After  discussion  with  the  World  Bank  the  government  has  decided  to  prevent  new
constructions of folds on the common pasture to delimit overgrazing of the land. Each
transgression will be fined and the Provincial Commissioner himself is charged with the
implementation.  Due to the fact that pastureland now has become a scarse resource,
pastoralists react to every violation by informing the local authorities. The building of
folds on common pastures bas become past practice.
40 The government appears to play a major role in the protection of the‑ rights of the settled
immigrant population. Most large herd owners, even those in the councils, want to go as
far to expel the cattle of all strangers, even from those already inhabiting the area for
more than a generation. As an example we may refer to the Ait Khaoua, originally from
Missour, but a1ready living with the Ait Abdi since the twinties. They formally counted
fourteen families and they earned their money as shepherds for the Ait Abdi. Now they
number 45 families and they have their own flocks,  amounting to 6000 head in total
(Belghiti‑Alaoui, 1978 : 190,225). Up to today there is regularly a mêlée between the Ait
Abdi and the Ait Khaoua. The district‑officer intervenes regularly to protect the latter.
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Disputes between the original population and immigrant families are common among the
Beni Mguild.
41 It  appears  that  the  local  authorities  have  obtained  strict  orders  from  the  central
government to protect the immigrant families. This means that those already settled and
having  their  own  flock  cannot  be  denied  the  access  to  the  pastures.  The  notion  of
property from the point of view of the central government protects here the rights of
immigrants.
42 Recently  the  local  authorities  and  the  rural  councils  have,  without  many  problems,
decided to prevent the introduction of herds on the pastures by new immigrants. This is
endorsed by the big herd‑owners. Nevertheless it appears quite difficult in practise to
prevent new outsiders introducing herds on the common pastures. ‑So it happens that a
livestock‑keeper who has sold his herd is contacted by a newcomer who offers him money
to rent his share in the pasture in order to be able to increase his herd. Then he buys an
additional herd and introduces it on the common pasture but tells to everybody he is only
the shepherd and the herd is owned by somebody else. Due to completion now this type
of transactions are always passed on to the state officials. The district officers intervenes
but rumours have that 'renting of shares' is still practice and,  indeed, is more difficult to
prevent than the building of folds.
Conclusion
43 From the foregoing it is clear that it is very difficult to decrease the number of cattle,
although it is an imperative to arrest land degradation.
44 Our case shows that the livestock‑owners do not live together in an egalitarian society
although this is often stated for pastoral societies. Among the population of the Middle
Atlas 'big men' have always presented themselves and local stratification only increased
in the colonial period. The tribal land, in theory open for all tribesmen, appeared de facto
been appropriated by the big herd owners by the building of folds and the trucking of
water. The introduction of the 'pastoral association project' only did increase economic
stratification because the rich pastoralists captured the association. So only the rich herd
owners  profited  from the  advantages  connected  with  the association.  To  argue  that
common land opens opportunity for the poor and for this reason must be maintained,
seems not to be quite realistic (Jodha, 1991).
45 Because the Beni  Mguild society is  stratified,  new organizations introduced from the
outside become incorporated in local power networks. Both the pastoral association as
well as the rural council are in the hands of the rich herd owners. The consequence is that
they are able to block the destocking policy. When the creation of local institutions is left
over to the local population, local power stratification will only be enforced. We disagree
with the point of view of the World Bank which states : "To succeed, cooperation has to be
voluntary and managed from below. Grassroots management is one way to ensure this.
Alternatively, cooperatives can be based on customary social structures and groups as
they often are" (1989 :  103,  see also Swift,  1991).  My point of view is that traditional
organizations  and leadership have been undermined and have not  incorporated new
functions.  The two World Bank officials  have based their  conclusions  on insufficient
research.
46 Attwood a.o. (1988 :50‑53) have argued that destocking programs in livestock projects are
difficult  to  achieve.  The  Beni  Mguild  herdsmen  have  refused  to  do  so.  Instead  of
regulating the size of their own flock, they try to inhibit the access to pastureland by
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'outsiders'  although  most  live  in  the  area  already  a  generation  or  even  more.  This
resulted in numerous conflicts about access to the pastures. It is very strange that in
livestock projects the rights of the immigrant families is hardly acknowledged. Not only
among the Middle Atlas population there are immigrants. This is also the case in other
parts of Morocco and in other countries : the former 'closed' resources appear to be open
for 'outsiders' (see a.o. Dyson‑Hudson, 1985 ; Shepherd, 1989).
47 It  is  clear  that  arresting  land  degeneration  cannot  be  brought  about  by  local
management. In the current rhetoric of the withdrawal of the state such notions may
appear popular but they pass over the hard reality of internal polarisation. The degree of
internal conflicts is such that the government has to play much more than a supportive
role.  We  agree  with  Lawry  (1989)  that  the  local  communities  together  with  the
government have to look for solutions. And then we cannot do without certain policies
imposed from above.
48 In view of the hierarchical and even feudal relationships in Morocco the role of the large
livestock‑owners  cannot  be  restrained  by  the  local  population  itself.  Although  the
Moroccan  government  is  itself  an  expression  of  the  society  it  appeared  that  the
government is able to choose between several policy options. So the World Bank and the
central government have succeeded to implement several policies,  making use of the
individualism and completion among the livestock‑owners.
49 As is stated by Redcliff (1987 :200), if we rely too much on the market forces then the
right of the strongest will dictate the course of events. Livestock projects in stratified
societies which want to offer opportunities to &l members of the community can only be
successful if concrete support is given by the central government
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